John Stuart Mill on prostitution : radical sentiments, liberal proscriptions. by McGlynn, Clare
Durham Research Online
Deposited in DRO:
25 October 2012
Version of attached file:
Peer-review status of attached file:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
McGlynn, Clare (2012) ’John Stuart Mill on prostitution : radical sentiments, liberal proscriptions.’,
Nineteenth-century gender studies., 8 (2).
Further information on publisher’s website:
http://www.ncgsjournal.com/issue82/mcglynn.htm
Publisher’s copyright statement:
Additional information:
Reproduced with permission of Cardinal Stritch University. Article first published in Nineteenth-century gender studies.
Use policy
The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom
Tel : +44 (0)191 334 3042 — Fax : +44 (0)191 334 2971
http://dro.dur.ac.uk
1 
 
John Stuart Mill on Prostitution: Radical Sentiments, Liberal Proscriptions 
 
By Clare McGlynn, Durham University 
 
 
“If ever any system of privilege and enforced subjection had its yoke tightly riveted 
on the necks of those who are kept down by it, this has.” 
John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women (Collected Works, 21: 268)1 
 
“Take the foot off our necks, then we will hear in what tongue women speak.” 
Catharine Mackinnon, Feminism Unmodified (45) 
 
 
<1> When we think of the great nineteenth century debates on the regulation of prostitution, 
the name of John Stuart Mill does not immediately spring to mind. In studies of both 
nineteenth century prostitution, and of Mill’s writing, there is scant reference to his thinking 
on this subject. In terms of feminist scholarship, this is understandable; such work frequently 
focuses on the often marginalized role of women activists in legal reform and on revealing 
the untold stories of women’s lives as prostitutes. But in the context of the vast corpus of Mill 
scholarship, this lack of attention to his views on prostitution is at first surprising. Indeed, 
despite the avowed renaissance in Mill scholarship over the past few decades, there are only 
two substantive analyses of Mill’s opinions on prostitution. Jeremy Waldron’s essay, 
although providing insightful analysis, only considers Mill on prostitution as a means of 
further explication of his other philosophical works, rather than as an analysis of prostitution 
regulation per se.2 Similarly, while Jim Jose and Kcasey-Renea McLoughlin rightly challenge 
Waldron’s analysis by re-asserting the importance of Mill’s feminism, their specific focus is 
not prostitution and related debates over its regulation.  
 
 
<2> This confirms Maria Morales’ argument that “systematic philosophical reflection of 
Mill’s significant body of work on matters concerning women’s social condition has come 
relatively slowly and continues to suffer from considerable gaps” (“Rational Freedom” 43). 
And so, perhaps, this lacuna should not come as such a surprise, despite the central role of 
both the phenomenon of prostitution and Mill himself in the emergence of feminist activism 
and ideas. In this article, I suggest that this failure to engage with Mill’s writings on 
prostitution impoverishes historical and philosophical analyses of Mill himself and his 
philosophy, and of our understanding more generally of prostitution regulation in the 
nineteenth century. Drawing on Mill’s evidence before a Royal Commission investigating the 
regulation of prostitution via the Contagious Diseases Acts, his opinions on prostitution 
expressed in On Liberty and his personal correspondence, I argue that an examination of 
Mill’s approach to prostitution regulation can enrich our understanding of Mill’s impact on 
nineteenth century debates over the role of the state and law, especially in matters of morality 
and sexual freedom. Further, my analysis adds weight to propositions that Mill was a more 
radical feminist than is often assumed. Indeed, I will suggest that a study of Mill’s approach 
to prostitution regulation shows that, at least in his sentiments, if not in his proscriptions for 
law reform, he was more closely aligned to what we would now term radical feminist 
thinking, than is often thought to be the case.  
 
 
Prostitution: the “great social evil”  
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<3> Prostitution, of course, was a great social concern in the nineteenth century. It was a 
focus for considerable political campaigning and debate as it drew together a range of 
controversies such as the emerging and developing role of the state, the liberalization of sex 
and sexual activity, and the role of women and feminist activism. As a subject matter for 
political debate, it dominated discussions throughout the 1850s and 1860s, engendering the 
greatest controversy with the enactment of the Contagious Diseases Acts . This series of 
measures, first enacted in 1864 and finally repealed in 1886, empowered the relevant 
authorities to subject suspected prostitutes in named military towns and ports to internal 
medical examinations and, if found to be suffering from venereal disease, to be detained in 
specific hospitals for up to nine months. The immediate impetus for this coercive legislation 
was concern over the efficacy of the military due to the high incidence of venereal disease. 
The Acts were, therefore, primarily aimed at preventing the spread of the disease among the 
military, though the wives and children of men using prostitutes, who then became infected, 
were the subject of concern.  
 
 
<4> While the first Act in 1864 was passed almost without comment, protest grew very 
quickly at the instigation of the emerging feminist movement (Walkowitz 1; McHugh 37). 
Josephine Butler formed the Ladies’ National Association for the Repeal of the Contagious 
Diseases Acts and, while there was much general support for repeal, it was feminist 
campaigning that was largely responsible for the eventual reform. By the late 1860s, agitation 
had grown to such an extent that in order to placate opposition, the government established a 
Royal Commission to investigate the operation of the Acts.  
 
 
<5> It was in this heightened atmosphere of political tension that Mill appeared before the 
Royal Commission. His evidence provides a clear insight into his approach to prostitution 
regulation, though this was not the first time that his views on the subject were made public 
(Mill 21: 351-371). In his paean to personal freedom, On Liberty, Mill considered the 
justification of legal sanctions against pimps (28: 296-297). Overlooked then as now, these 
passages in On Liberty, together with his Royal Commission evidence, provide crucial 
information on his publicly expressed views. To these sources can now be supplemented 
insights revealed from his letters, particularly those written during the repeal campaign 
against the Acts (17: 1692-1693).  
 
 
<6> Like most of his contemporaries, Mill saw prostitution as one of the “great social evils” 
of his time. He declaimed that  
with the exception of sheer brutal violence, there is no greater evil that this propensity 
[male sexuality] can produce than prostitution. Of all the modes of sexual indulgence, 
consistent with personal freedom and the safety of women, I regard prostitution as the 
very worst; not only on account of the wretched women whose sole existence it 
sacrifices, but because no other is anything like so corrupting to the men. (17: 1693).  
 
 
<7> This statement reveals Mill’s common ground with the dominant public mood, which 
labeled prostitution a social evil (Walkowitz 32). But it also identifies key differences, 
particularly in terms of understanding or explaining male sexuality. As Judith Walkowitz has 
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written, the “unthinking acceptance of male sexual licence set the tone for parliamentary 
discussions of prostitution, regulation and the age of consent during most of the Victorian 
period” (Walkowitz 70). But not only was male sexual license an accepted facet of society, so 
was the idea that such sexuality was innate and immutable, something that was simply to be 
acknowledged and managed (Kingsley Kent, 60-79). It was such assumptions that generated 
the idea of prostitution as a “safety valve,” a necessary expedient to enable men to satisfy 
their innate urges (Mill 17: 1692-1693; Kingsley Kent, 60-79). 
 
 
<8> Mill dismissed this conception of male sexuality and that of prostitution as a “safety-
valve.” Such an approach, he said, was “the true conservative stand point” (17:1692). He 
suggested that such ideas had been “fostered” by the “tendencies of civilisation (which has 
been a civilisation left mainly to the influence of men)” (17: 1692). In other words, Mill 
argued that as men have dominated society and culture, they have been able to create and 
sustain a particular view of their sexuality, one which requires social norms accepting its 
inevitability and permitting its release. But far from being innate and immutable, Mill argued 
that sexuality is socially constructed and, indeed, that as society progresses, sexual “passion” 
would come “completely under the control of the reason” (16: 1693). As Richard Bellamy 
points out, Mill’s pursuit of individualism was not about a “licence for the unrestricted 
satisfaction of one’s wants and desires,” but consisted “in the ability to rise above sensual, 
animal instincts and passions through force of will” (“T. H. Green” 132).   
 
 
<9> Similarly, in The Subjection of Women, published in 1869, Mill rejected the idea that 
women and men’s differences were based in nature and that the doctrine of separate spheres 
was therefore ‘natural’ (Tulloch xv; Mill 21: 261-340). Mill challenged the idea that the 
status quo was inevitable, rejecting arguments from nature and biology about the status of 
women, and he suggested that we cannot really know women’s true nature in view of the 
social conditioning to which they have been subject (Tulloch, xiv).3 We can see, therefore, 
that Mill rejected common assumptions about men and women, arguing that sexuality was 
socially constructed and social norms were generated and sustained by men’s dominance, in 
politics, culture and their “almost despotic power” as husbands (Mill 18: 301; Tulloch 159).  
 
 
Challenging the Male Demand for Prostitution 
 
 
<10> As well as challenging dominant ideas about the innate nature of men’s sexuality and 
thus the inevitability of prostitution, Mill also departed from dominant thinking on where the 
blame should lie for the existence of prostitution; such blame was generally placed at the foot 
of women working as prostitutes. This approach was epitomized in the 1871 Royal 
Commission report on the Acts which rejected any argument that the women and men who 
participated in this “sin of fornication” were to be treated equally: “there is no comparison to 
be made between prostitutes and the men who consort with them. With the one sex the 
offence is committed as a matter of gain; with the other it is an irregular indulgence of a 
natural impulse” (Royal Commission xix; Walkowitz 71). As Belinda Brooks-Gordon has 
argued, the “image of the innocent male seduced by the self-seeking immoral female 
permeated discourse on prostitution in Victorian England”; here this image becomes 
enshrined in the Acts (7). 
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<11> Challenging such an argument, Mill made his position clear on where the “blame” lay 
in his evidence to the Royal Commission. As noted above, the Acts were introduced with the 
aim of reducing the incidence and spread of venereal disease; the means chosen to meet this 
end was the subjection of women working as prostitutes to inspection and possible detention. 
Mill challenged the means employed, commenting that a “woman cannot communicate the 
disease but to a person who seeks it, and who knowingly places himself in the way of it” (21: 
354). He continued that a “woman can only communicate it through a man; it must be the 
man who communicates it to innocent women and children afterwards” (21: 354). Mill stated, 
therefore, that if the object of legislation was to protect innocent wives (as well as the army), 
then “the way to do that is to bring motives to bear on the man and not on the woman” (21: 
354). And Mill continued that he considered there to be various ways to focus on the man’s 
actions. He suggested that if the police were to engage in ‘espionage’ to identify prostitutes, 
as the Acts provided, then the ‘same degree of espionage’ should ‘detect the men who go 
with’ prostitutes and the men can ‘be obliged to give an account why they are there’ (21: 
354).  
 
 
<12> This evidence was incendiary and was met with incredulity from the (all male) Royal 
Commissioners, one of whom asked: “Am I to understand you seriously propose that in this 
country we should adopt a system of espionage over every man seen going into a brothel, and 
that men seen to go into a brothel should be subject all alike to personal examination?” (21: 
362) Mill did not support the “espionage” introduced by the Acts, but where such regime was 
to be deployed, with the purported aim of reducing the prevalence of venereal disease, then 
Mill did indeed consider that a focus on men who demand prostitution was appropriate. And, 
in actual fact, he went further. He also recommended “very severe damages in case a man is 
provided to have communicated this disease to a modest woman, and in the case of his wife, 
divorce is a matter of right; I think that a stronger case in which to apply the remedy of 
divorce can hardly be conceived” (21: 354-55). Mill considered that this “crime,” of 
communicating disease to the innocent, was “one of the gravest a man could possibly 
commit,” it being “so serious as to warrant the dissolving of the marriage tie” (21: 355). 
Advocating a right to divorce for women on this basis was radical in the extreme and 
emphasised the significance of Mill’s focus on men’s actions and role in relation to the 
prevalence of prostitution. 
 
 
<13> Mill’s locus of the blame for prostitution on men, and his recommendations for 
constraining this male demand, represented a serious challenge to commonplace beliefs not 
just about marriage and divorce, but also to attitudes towards women working as prostitutes. 
The Acts, Mill declared in his Royal Commission evidence, could not be “justified on 
principle, because it appears to me to be opposed to one of the greatest principles of 
legislation, the security of personal liberty” (21: 351). His concern was not just with a 
“particular class of women,” that is prostitutes, but “all women whatever” because of the 
discretion of the police to label any woman a prostitute. He referred to the subjection of 
women to medical inspection as a “tyrannical operation by force of law.” In private 
correspondence, Mill referred to the Acts as “utterly depraving to the mass of the population’ 
and representing ‘gross inequality between men and women” (16: 1688). 
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<14> What is striking here is not just that Mill sees this legislation as an affront to liberty, but 
specifically a challenge to the freedom of all women, including women prostitutes. Even 
where the disquiet was with “innocent” women being labelled prostitutes, few extended 
concern to the women themselves. Indeed, the prominence at the time of Lecky’s defence of 
prostitution due to its performance as a “safety valve,” was not just based on ideas of male 
sexual right, but also on the grounds that it protected virtuous women from being subjected to 
their husband’s demands, revealing his deep disinterest in the welfare or interests of women 
working as prostitutes (Lecky 300). Not only was Mill publicly defending the rights of 
women prostitutes, but he was also undermining the sotto voce argument of defenders of the 
legislation, namely that it protected the personal liberty of men who used prostitutes by 
reducing the risk of their being infected with disease. As Jim Jose and Kcasey-Renea 
McLoughlin argue, in Mill’s view, the legislation “enshrined men’s privileges and by 
extension reinforced their sexual despotism . . . while simultaneously denying personal 
liberty to women” (11).  
 
 
<15> It was this attack on the privileges of men demanding prostitution that, as we have seen, 
invoked the indignation of the Royal Commissioners. Mill was demonstrating in his evidence 
the application of his principles of equality, here arguing not just for the formal equality of 
women and men before the law in terms of both being subject to the Acts, but also a more 
substantive understanding of the inequalities facing women. Mill did not wish to simply 
remove the Acts from the statute book and carry on. He wished to focus attention on the men 
who create the demand for prostitution and without whom, he considered, there would be no 
requirement for this or similar forms of legislation. In doing so, he recognized that women 
undertaking prostitution were often doing so as a result of economic or other adverse 
circumstances.4 
 
 
<16> Mill’s sympathies lay with the women whom he saw as part of the “criminal and 
vicious classes” more generally (21: 366). He supported greater intervention in the lives of 
the poor and “dangerous classes” to encourage and help them out of their destitution; what he 
did not support was the especial focus on prostitution (21: 366). In other words, he saw the 
plight of the women prostitutes as part and parcel of the general conditions of poverty of the 
working class which demanded action. He concluded: “It would not be beyond the proper 
function of the State to take means of making these persons understand that they are not 
considered as totally unworthy of any kind of regard or consideration by the rest of their 
fellow-creatures, but that it is the object to reclaim them, and do them as much good as their 
condition makes them susceptible of. Such measures, at all events, might be applied to the 
dangerous classes more generally, much more than ever has been done yet” (21: 366). 
 
 
Prostitution and the Proper Function of the State 
 
 
<17> In today’s parlance, the Acts legalised prostitution. Mill was fundamentally opposed: “I 
do not think that prostitution should be classed and recognized as such by the State.” (21: 
359) He considered that the legislation “provide[s] securities beforehand against the 
consequences of immoralities of any kind” (21: 353). This he saw as entirely different from 
remedying consequences after they occur; that is, treating women or men for venereal disease 
once they have been infected. Indeed, in trying to ensure that prostitutes are free from 
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disease, the “State is in fact going out of its way to provide facilities for the practice of that 
profession” (21: 354). The Acts gave “some degree of encouragement” to prostitution (21: 
355). Indeed, when asked about legal regimes which provide a form of licensing of some 
prostitutes and prostitution-related activities, as was common on the continent at the time, he 
stated that his objections to the Acts “exist in an extreme against licences because they have 
still more of the character of toleration of that kind of vicious indulgence than exists under 
the Acts at present” (21: 356). In arguing that the Acts encouraged “vice,” Mill wrote that 
there is “no parallel case of an indulgence or pursuit so avowedly disgraceful and immoral for 
which the government provides safeguards” (26: 1791). To make his point, he suggested that 
a parallel case would be “supplying stomach pumps for drunkards, or arrangements for 
lending money to gamblers who would otherwise be tempted into theft” (16: 1791). In 
response to those who argued in favour of “establishing prostitution on a legitimate basis,” he 
stated: “I think them completely wrong in principle and mistaken as to the practical benefits 
which seem to arise from such a plan” (16: 1524).  
 
 
<18> In relation to such pragmatic considerations, and drawing on his knowledge of 
continental regulation, Mill also argued that legalization of this form leads to “clandestine” 
prostitution; In other words, it leads to the sort of two-tier prostitution that today plagues such 
regulatory systems. He also suggested that because of the legitimising effect of regulation, 
and as the Acts “afford increased security to the men who frequent these women, it is liable 
to produce an increase in the demand for prostitutes and therefore bring forth in that way an 
increased supply” (21: 364). He continued by arguing that if licensing were introduced in 
new areas, there might be a diminution of “avowed prostitution, without any real diminution 
of real prostitution”; that is, the “problem” would simply change shape or geographical area, 
rather than diminish (21: 364).  
 
 
<19> This trenchant critique of legalisation, however, gave way to a considerably more 
equivocal stance when the individual liberty of pimps and brothel-keepers came into 
question. Mill first raised these issues in On Liberty when he considered that “fornication, for 
example, must be tolerated . . . but should a person be free to be a pimp?” Mill stated the 
general principle should be that: “Whatever it is permitted to do, it must be permitted to 
advise to do” (18: 296). Thus, as fornication was lawful, and should not be proscribed, so its 
promotion or instigation should similarly be lawful. However, he continued that this general 
principle may be in doubt when the instigator “derives a personal benefit from his advice; 
when he makes it his occupation, for subsistence or pecuniary gain, to promote what society 
and the state consider to be an evil” (18: 296). In such situations, there is a “class of persons 
with an interest opposed to what is considered as the public weal and whose mode of living is 
grounded on the counteraction of it” (18: 296). 
 
 
<20> This is a situation, he stated, which lay on the “exact boundary line between two 
principles, and it is not at once apparent to which of the two it properly belongs. There are 
arguments on both sides” (18: 296). On the side of “toleration,” he continued, merely 
following an occupation “cannot make that criminal which would otherwise be admissible” 
and that “society has no business, as society, to decide anything to be wrong which concerns 
only the individual” (18: 296). On the other hand, although the public, or the State are not 
warranted in authoritatively deciding, for purposes of repression or punishment, that such or 
such conduct affecting only the interests of the individual is good or bad’, they are 
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nonetheless, “fully justified in assuming, as they regard it as bad, that is being so or not is at 
least a disputable question” (18: 296-97). In such circumstances, the state “cannot be acting 
wrongly in endeavouring to exclude the influence of solicitations which are not disinterested” 
(18: 297). There can “surely . . . be nothing lost, no sacrifice of good” by ensuring that 
individuals “either wisely or foolishly” act on their own prompting, as “free as possible from 
the arts of persons who stimulate their inclinations for interested purposes of their own” (18: 
297). In such arguments, Mill held that there is “considerable force,” but he declined to 
decide whether they were sufficient to justify the “moral anomaly of punishing the 
accessary,” of “fining or imprisoning the procurer, but not the fornicator” (18: 297).  
 
 
<21> Mill took a similar position when asked about the regulation of brothel-keeping during 
his evidence before the Royal Commission. He stated that this was an “extremely difficult 
question” and that he would rather not give an opinion on it “because so many pros and cons 
have occurred to me when I have thought about it that I have found it very difficult to make 
up my mind” (21: 369). He had “always felt it very difficult to lay down a general rule on the 
subject” (21: 360). Nevertheless, he did assume some level of regulation, posing the question 
as one of whether brothels “should be systematically put down, or let alone to a certain 
degree” (21: 369). His ambivalence arose due to the “very wide reaching considerations as to 
the degree to which the law should interfere in questions of simple morality and also how far 
it should attack one portion of the persons who conspire to do a particular act while it 
tolerates others” (21: 360). 
 
<22> On other questions of prostitution regulation, Mill made clear that he did he see the 
necessity of street solicitation being controlled and that this was “the duty of the police, in 
order to preserve the order of the streets” (21: 369); though it is certainly arguable that he 
would have objected to specific laws on the subject. He also raised the possibility of stronger 
measures to prevent young women being encouraged into prostitution, stating that: “I perhaps 
would go further for the protection of the extremely young persons that most people would” 
and continuing that he would not “be at all averse to raising considerably the age below 
which it should be prohibited” to have intercourse of any kind with young girls (21: 365). 
Mill drew quite a clear line between those who he deemed to have capacity, and therefore to 
be free to make their own, often wrong, decisions, and those who lacked capacity in respect 
of which significant, preventative and potentially coercive measures could be taken for their 
own good.  
 
 
Prostitution Regulation: Liberal and Radical Feminist Perspectives  
 
 
<21> Mill is generally characterised as the quintessential liberal feminist (Gray, xxiv). As 
suggested by Gail Tulloch and Wendy Donner, Mill’s liberalism is assumed to replicate 
liberal feminist modes of thinking and theorising. Translating “Mill the liberal feminist” into 
debates on prostitution regulation leads to further assumptions, exemplified by Belinda 
Cheney: “The liberal view, stemming from the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, is that the law 
has no legitimate function in prohibiting anyone from choosing or practising the lifestyle of 
prostitution, or in penalizing adults who, by consent, engage in sexual activity for money” 
(248). While Cheney’s characterization of this approach as “liberal” is apposite, her linking 
of these modes of thought to Mill is not.  
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<22> Indeed, it is difficult to see Mill’s thinking reflected in any of the different varieties of 
regulatory regimes currently labelled “liberal.” Taking legalization first, this approach 
manages prostitution, permitting it in specific circumstances, often with geographical zones 
and/or the provision of licences. It is an approach closely associated with jurisdictions such as 
the Netherlands, parts of Australia, and the US state of Nevada (Brents and Hausbeck, 270-
295; Kilvington et al, 78-921; Weitzer 88-105). Closely associated with the idea of a 
“necessary evil” (21: 371), legalisation is also the informal choice of many public authorities 
who may turn a blind eye to prostitution-related activities even when prohibited. Supported 
by many as a pragmatic response to an intractable problem, liberal feminist Martha 
Nussbaum argues that legalisation “is likely to make things a little better for women who 
have too few options to begin with” (278).  
 
 
<23> It was precisely legalisation in the form of the Acts to which Mill vehemently objected, 
viewing it as state toleration of a harmful practice. While Mill’s perspective is a moral one at 
root, his argument was also that legalisation would be ineffective in reducing prostitution and 
may in fact lead to its increase. The difference here between Mill and other liberals who 
similarly find prostitution unwelcome, but advocate its toleration, is that Mill’s liberalism is 
an “ethical liberalism,” founded on the strong moral discourse of character (Bellamy 
“Liberalism” 2; Jones, 287-308). This is Mill the “public moralist” (Collini viii) who argued 
that “genuine social reform must be premised on the reformation of the moral world” 
(Morales “The Corrupting Influence” 101). He could not countenance the state legitimating 
both the practice of prostitution and its associated assumptions about male sexuality.  
 
 
<24> Another approach, often termed liberal, is a mixed variety of regulation exemplified in 
England and Wales and propounded by the 1957 Wolfenden Report which recommended that 
the act of selling or purchasing sex itself remain lawful, but that most associated activities, 
such as soliciting, kerb-crawling and brothel-keeping, be criminalized (Wolfenden, 79-117). 
Characterised as an “influential liberal statement” (Weeks 239), the Report created a clear 
public-private divide, purporting to balance the private interests of individuals who may wish 
to engage in prostitution, with ensuring that the public are protected from the “nuisance” and 
“offence” of prostitution in their streets (Matthews, 98-100). However, focusing on street 
activities has meant a disproportionate criminalisation of women prostitutes, justified by 
Wolfenden on the basis that: “the simple fact is that prostitutes do parade themselves more 
habitually and openly than their prospective customers, and do by their continual presence 
affront the sense of decency of the ordinary citizen” (87). 
 
 
<25> As in the case of legalisation, it is commonly assumed that the Wolfenden-based 
approach also reflects Mill’s thinking (Hart 14; Devlin 105); yet as in the case of legalization, 
there is little real evidence to support such a claim. The public-private divide, writ large in 
Wolfenden regulatory approaches, is often suggested as a liberal tenet. Yet Mill was a clear 
advocate of “interference” in the private lives of citizens. Indeed, as Morales argues, Mill was 
the first liberal to criticize the public-private divide and to “underscore the incompatibility of 
domination in the ‘private’ realm with equality, justice and democratic rule in the ‘public’” 
(“Rational Freedom” 46). Mill advocated fundamental reform of the institution of marriage, 
not just in the terms of the public nature of the contract, but most specifically in relation to 
the private relations between husband and wife (21: 259-340; Tulloch 1989). He condemned 
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the “despotic” power of husbands and the concomitant prevalence of what we now label as 
rape and domestic violence within marriage (Morales “Rational Freedom”, 47). For Mill, 
therefore, it would never have been sufficient or satisfactory to simply introduce reform to 
remove prostitution from public gaze. Moreover, the disproportionate focus on women would 
have attracted Mill’s ire, as would the location of blame on women as psychologically flawed 
temptresses of men.  
 
 
<26> The other principal liberal approach is that of decriminalization, which entails repealing 
laws that specifically target prostitution, regulating it in similar ways to any other form of 
work.5 To the extent that this mode of regulation does not specifically target prostitution, Mill 
would be an ally. Mill was especially critical of the Acts because they centred attention on 
just one group of vulnerable people, women prostitutes, and provided treatment for just one 
medical condition, infection with venereal disease. But it is in relation to the conceptual 
foundation of decriminalization, and the other liberal regulatory regimes considered above, to 
which Mill would have exercised some distance. Decriminalization is premised on libertarian 
arguments about individual choice, lack of demonstrable harm, and personal privacy and is 
akin to other liberal modes of regulation in terms of its neutral stance on the morality of 
prostitution and its acceptance of the inevitability of prostitution. As we have seen, Mill was 
clearly critical of prostitution, pimps and brothel-keepers. He was not neutral, nor did he 
regard pimping or brothel keeping as private activities to be shielded and protected from 
public regulation. His criticism focused on those who encouraged prostitution, especially for 
their personal gain, and who exploited the often vulnerable.  
 
 
<27> It seems, thus far, that Mill shares little common ground with current liberal approaches 
to prostitution regulation. Indeed, when we look at his foundational principles, focusing on 
the “guilt of the man” rather than of the “prostitute herself” (Reeves 431), we see that his 
guiding beliefs are more akin to that of modern day radical feminist ideas that identify the 
male demand for prostitution as the cause of prostitution, the reason for its continuation, and 
the locus of its harm.6 Viewed as a form of violence against women, prostitution is 
considered by radical feminism as evidence of men’s continued dominance in society and an 
expression of on-going assumptions about the necessity and validity of male demands for 
sexual access to women. Mill shared such perceptions. 
 
 
<28> Mill also shared the ambition of radical feminists to eradicate prostitution, envisioning 
a society in which there was no need for prostitution. His radical proposals for an egalitarian 
conception of marriage, what he termed “perfect equality,” were to result in significant 
change in men and women’s relations such that prostitution would not be sought out (21: 
261). In addition, progress, and in particular progress towards his ideal form of character, he 
thought, would lead to the more rational treatment of sex and sexual activity. In this way, the 
radical and progressive vision of a society in which marriage is based on ideals of perfect 
equality, and men and women have risen above the animal instincts of sex, would be a 
society that had no need for prostitution.7 
 
 
<29> Mill, therefore, shared the sentiments of radical feminism. However, he would have 
departed from their proscriptions for law reform. Focusing on the demand for prostitution, 
radical feminists advocate the criminalization of the purchase of all sexual services, with the 
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ultimate aim of eradicating prostitution. The corollary of the criminalization of users is the 
decriminalization of those who sell sex, thereby recognizing their vulnerability and 
facilitating their exit from prostitution. As discussed by Gunilla Ekberg, this approach aims to 
clearly distinguish between the vulnerability of those selling sex and the culpability of those 
who generate the demand. 
 
 
<30> But as we have seen, for Mill, the individual act of buying or selling sex was not itself 
sufficient to warrant legal proscription. He envisioned abolition, but saw this as likely to 
occur due to broader changes in society, especially the emergence of a more egalitarian form 
of marriage. He did not see legal proscriptions as a prerequisite to ensure the eradication of 
prostitution. Nor did he see the harm in the specific act of purchasing or selling sex, such that 
he would endorse a radical feminist commitment to criminalize the users of prostitution. It 
was exploitation and the profit motive that troubled him. Gertrude Himmelfarb has suggested 
that much as Mill “would have liked to put the procurer or keeper of a gambling house out of 
business, he could not bring himself to do so without imperilling his basic principle” 
(Himmelfarb 319). His sentiments were with radical feminism, and this informed his 
approach to legal regulation. Mill’s sympathy clearly lay with the women who worked as 
prostitutes and his condemnation focused on the men he saw as exploiting vulnerable women 
and being responsible for many forms of oppression. But where there was no such coercion 
or exploitation, liberty should prevail. Perhaps, in this light and in relation to brothels, Mill 
might have endorsed measures that enable small numbers of women to work together as 
prostitutes, forming what have been termed in current debates “mini-brothels” (Barrett 2006); 
he might have endorsed subjecting only those brothels engaged in more coercive, exploitative 
behaviours to legal sanction and regulation. Potentially there is a message here for 
contemporary debates on prostitution regulation. Mill’s approach may well offer a blend of 
radical and liberal feminism, possibly a welcome compromise for modern day feminists and 
lawmakers who continue to grapple with the challenge of regulating prostitution. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
 
<31> What is evident from Mill’s writings on prostitution and its regulation is his moral 
condemnation of the practice, but a rejection of the path followed by those of a similar moral 
persuasion, namely suppression, criminalization, and the denunciation of women prostitutes. 
Mill contested the unassailed prerogatives of men in the sexual arena, challenging 
assumptions about male sexual right. He demanded equality of treatment in whatever form 
regulation is adopted and recognized that the phenomenon of prostitution shone a light on the 
poverty and destitution of the working classes more generally. He openly equivocated on key 
issues where he saw a potential conflict between his principles, worrying about the use of law 
to exploit those without resources or power and concerned to ensure the progressive 
development of individual character.  
 
 
<32> These insights counter common assumptions about Mill, his liberalism generally, and 
his feminism specifically. Gail Tulloch argues that when Mill’s thought is taken as a whole, 
and in particular when The Subjection of Women is given due weight, we can see that “Mill 
had a more positive conception of the role of the state and allowed more scope for 
government intervention than is commonly supposed” (Tulloch xvi). This is because his 
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thinking is embedded in a rich conception of the good life and the promotion of “character” 
(Bellamy, 22). The detailed analysis of Mill’s thinking on prostitution presented in this essay, 
therefore, supports the argument that Mill was not as anti-regulation as is often suggested. 
Indeed, he clearly adhered to the idea of a public interest or public good that the state could 
and should protect. This is not to suggest that he was an ardent advocate of prostitution 
regulation, but that his thinking is more complex, more nuanced, and more equivocal on 
questions of regulation and liberty than is often assumed.   
 
 
<33> And in relation to his feminist credentials, the conceptualization of Mill arising from 
this analysis is one that reveals his radical edge, his counter-hegemonic spirit. This supports 
the argument of Keith Burgess-Jackson who has suggested that “Mill’s views on the social 
and legal status of women are more closely aligned with those of contemporary radical 
feminists than with those of contemporary liberal feminists” (Burgess-Jackson 72). Burgess-
Jackson questions the assumptions made about Mill’s liberal feminism, advocating a deeper 
analysis of his conceptualization of equality and explanations for women’s unequal status. 
Indeed, it was radical feminist Kate Millet who, in one of the early second-wave feminist 
reviews of Mill, saw his radical potential, in particular his rejection of absolutist and 
biological explanations for women’s disadvantaged status, for his recognition of the role of 
society in shaping women and men’s expectations and on-going discrimination (Tulloch xiii). 
Similarly, Morales has demonstrated this radical potential in her analysis of Mill’s activism, 
arguing that Mill characterized domestic violence as “crimes of sexual domination motivated 
and maintained by an oppressive sexual ethic” (“Rational Freedom” 47). Thus, while it is 
well known that Mill considered marriage and family life to be oppressive for women, far 
less is said either about the specific ways in which this domination manifested itself, or Mill’s 
specific linking of such despotism to his condemnation of battery, marital rape, domestic 
violence and child abuse (“Rational Freedom” 51; Tulloch 106).  
 
 
<34> Tulloch has summarized Mill’s feminism as follows: “Mill’s critique of the status quo 
is radical, and his practical proposals reformist” (66-7). In essence, she argues, he failed to 
see that his demands for equality, for reform of marriage, and the development of character, 
would not of themselves be sufficient to create the egalitarian society that he envisioned. He 
shared this failing with feminist activists who also thought that gaining the suffrage would be 
the catalyst for significant changes in law and public policy to the betterment of women 
specifically and equality generally. For this reason, while Mill condemned the practice of 
prostitution, and the dominant approaches both to understanding its causes and proposals for 
regulation, he fell short of recommending radical law reform not only on the basis of his 
liberty principles, but also because he envisaged a progressive change in society according to 
his ideas of character and public good. Mill was radical in his sentiments, though remaining 
liberal in his proscriptions for law reform. He is closer in his critique of prostitution, its 
causes and harms, to current radical feminist thinking, than to any of the various strands of 
liberal thinking. However, while his proscriptions were liberal, what we do not know is 
whether his views would have changed as it became clear that prostitution was not likely to 
disappear, even with the emergence of greater ideals of equality between women and men. If 
Mill had experienced the phenomenon of prostitution in its current form, would his radical 
sentiments have led to radical proscriptions for law reform?  
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1
  References to Mill are all to the Collected Works as edited by John Robson and published by the 
University of Toronto, 1963-1991. The Collected Works is also available online at: 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/?option=com_staticxt&staticfile=show.php%3Fperson=21&Itemid=28  
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2
  Waldron similarly expressed surprise at the lack of analysis of Mill’s approach to prostitution 
regulation, pointing out that ‘none of the copious literature on Mill’s essay On Liberty so much as mentions the 
relation between that essay and [Mill’s] evidence against the Contagious Diseases Acts’ (Waldron, 22). 
3
  In The Subjection of Women Mill stated that: ‘We can safely assert that the knowledge which men can 
acquire of women, even as they have been and are, without reference to what they might be, is wretchedly 
imperfect and superficial, and always will be so, until women themselves have told all that they have to tell’ (21, 
279).  
4
  At this time, there was little recognition of prostitution as a voluntary choice. Walkowitz suggests that 
when faced with arguments about voluntary prostitution and women prostitutes who did not want to be ‘saved’, 
feminist campaigners became ‘morally indignant’ (137).  
5  For a discussion of this approach, see the work of Gillian Abel et al and Belinda Brooks#
Gordon. 
6  The radical feminist approach to prostitution regulation is discussed in the work of Melissa 
Farley and Shiela Jeffreys.  
7
  Therefore, while moral conservatives also wish to abolish prostitution on moral grounds, the means to 
achieve this end result significantly differ, as does the explanation for the existence of prostitution. While Mill 
and radical feminists underline the role of male demand, moral conservatives largely target their vitriol at the 
women who work as prostitutes, suggesting that prostitution is driven by supply, by women tempting men 
towards irreligious or immoral indulgences.  
